In A Roundabout Way: Theory and Practice of Indirect Communication, DFG/FWF (Düsseldorf and Graz, starting date: October 2023)
Julia Zakkou and I have received an FWF/DFG grant for a research project on indirect communication. Here is a short description of the project:
We often say explicitly what we think and want. Sometimes, however, we communicate indirectly. We speak in a roundabout way and rely on others to read between the lines. The ways we do that are multifaceted, and the communicative intentions with which we do it can be varied. Not always are they transparent and not always are the communicative aims to everybody's best interest. On the contrary, as we have all experienced in personal interaction and observed following ongoing political events, the intentions can be opaque and the aims fairly self-serving. In light of this, one would expect indirect communication to be a central topic in philosophy, attracting attention from both theoretical and practical perspectives. So far, however, the focus has been on specific theoretical questions regarding a fairly narrow set of cases. The richness of ways in which we communicate indirectly has not been fully acknowledged, and the connection to practical issues, some of which of clear moral concern, is under explored. The project sets out to fill this lacuna. It aims to elucidate central aspects and crucial forms of indirect communication and to offer an in-depth analysis both of the reasons that drive, and the challenges caused by, the use and abuse of indirect communication.
Knowledge In Crisis, FWF (Wien, Salzburg, and Graz, starting date: October 2023)
I contribute as a key researcher to the Cluster of Excellence "Knowledge In Crisis". The PI of the project is Tim Crane. Here you can find a short description of the project (taken from the project page https://philosophy.ceu.edu/knowledge-crisis-project where you can find further information):
At the heart of the crisis of knowledge are philosophical problems about the relationship between knowledge, truth, science, ethics and politics; and ultimately our relationship to reality itself. Some of these questions are among the perennial questions of philosophy. For example: What is truth? What is knowledge? Who or what is a knower? Does science have any special authority in telling us what to believe? But some questions arise especially for us today. For example: how can we tell whether information on the internet is fake? Are there alternative facts? How can we allow a plurality of views and tolerate disagreement? How should scientific knowledge function in our democratic societies? What is democracy and how can it be defended? We need a new approach that brings thinkers from many areas of philosophy together - not just in the small part of philosophy that deals with questions about knowledge, but also in the fields of ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophies of science, mind, language and reality. These areas normally pursue their questions independently; Knowledge in Crisis will probe the deep connections between them, enabling a completely new understanding of today's crises of knowledge.
The Meaning of Evaluative Language, Swedish Research Council (Umeå and Graz, duration: January 2020 - December 2024)
Nils Franzén and I have a research project on the meaning of evaluative language which is funded by the Swedish Research Council. Here is a short description of the project:
We often make evaluative claims. We say things like that the treatment of the Rohingya in Myanmar is deplorable, that it’s good that the weather is turning colder, and that Ocean’s 8 was a surprisingly good movie. The nature of values like goodness, beauty and deplorableness has always occupied philosophers. Some philosophers have maintained that such values are objective qualities, whereas others have argued that they are somehow subjective in nature. To the latter group belong those who believe that evaluative discourse does not aim at describing a mind-independent reality at all but that it instead serves some other purpose, such as describing or expressing affective attitudes held by the speaker. The latter kind of theory is at bottom a linguistic one, since it is about the meaning of a specific class of terms and statements. Nevertheless, very little effort has been made to investigate whether such theories can be supported on linguistic grounds. The project aims to remedy this deficit by investigating whether there is any linguistic support for theories according to which evaluative discourse is subjective in nature.
Julia Zakkou and I have received an FWF/DFG grant for a research project on indirect communication. Here is a short description of the project:
We often say explicitly what we think and want. Sometimes, however, we communicate indirectly. We speak in a roundabout way and rely on others to read between the lines. The ways we do that are multifaceted, and the communicative intentions with which we do it can be varied. Not always are they transparent and not always are the communicative aims to everybody's best interest. On the contrary, as we have all experienced in personal interaction and observed following ongoing political events, the intentions can be opaque and the aims fairly self-serving. In light of this, one would expect indirect communication to be a central topic in philosophy, attracting attention from both theoretical and practical perspectives. So far, however, the focus has been on specific theoretical questions regarding a fairly narrow set of cases. The richness of ways in which we communicate indirectly has not been fully acknowledged, and the connection to practical issues, some of which of clear moral concern, is under explored. The project sets out to fill this lacuna. It aims to elucidate central aspects and crucial forms of indirect communication and to offer an in-depth analysis both of the reasons that drive, and the challenges caused by, the use and abuse of indirect communication.
Knowledge In Crisis, FWF (Wien, Salzburg, and Graz, starting date: October 2023)
I contribute as a key researcher to the Cluster of Excellence "Knowledge In Crisis". The PI of the project is Tim Crane. Here you can find a short description of the project (taken from the project page https://philosophy.ceu.edu/knowledge-crisis-project where you can find further information):
At the heart of the crisis of knowledge are philosophical problems about the relationship between knowledge, truth, science, ethics and politics; and ultimately our relationship to reality itself. Some of these questions are among the perennial questions of philosophy. For example: What is truth? What is knowledge? Who or what is a knower? Does science have any special authority in telling us what to believe? But some questions arise especially for us today. For example: how can we tell whether information on the internet is fake? Are there alternative facts? How can we allow a plurality of views and tolerate disagreement? How should scientific knowledge function in our democratic societies? What is democracy and how can it be defended? We need a new approach that brings thinkers from many areas of philosophy together - not just in the small part of philosophy that deals with questions about knowledge, but also in the fields of ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophies of science, mind, language and reality. These areas normally pursue their questions independently; Knowledge in Crisis will probe the deep connections between them, enabling a completely new understanding of today's crises of knowledge.
The Meaning of Evaluative Language, Swedish Research Council (Umeå and Graz, duration: January 2020 - December 2024)
Nils Franzén and I have a research project on the meaning of evaluative language which is funded by the Swedish Research Council. Here is a short description of the project:
We often make evaluative claims. We say things like that the treatment of the Rohingya in Myanmar is deplorable, that it’s good that the weather is turning colder, and that Ocean’s 8 was a surprisingly good movie. The nature of values like goodness, beauty and deplorableness has always occupied philosophers. Some philosophers have maintained that such values are objective qualities, whereas others have argued that they are somehow subjective in nature. To the latter group belong those who believe that evaluative discourse does not aim at describing a mind-independent reality at all but that it instead serves some other purpose, such as describing or expressing affective attitudes held by the speaker. The latter kind of theory is at bottom a linguistic one, since it is about the meaning of a specific class of terms and statements. Nevertheless, very little effort has been made to investigate whether such theories can be supported on linguistic grounds. The project aims to remedy this deficit by investigating whether there is any linguistic support for theories according to which evaluative discourse is subjective in nature.